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Income disparities between poorer and richer households in Germany have been 
widening since reunification. Although this income polarisation is reduced during 
economically favourable periods by strong growth in employment, once the good 
times are over, it rises all the faster.
The longer-term trend not only shows that the number of poorer households is stead-
ily increasing, but also that on average they are getting poorer. On the flip side, the 
trend is toward an increasing number of richer individuals, whose average wealth is 
steadily increasing. This contrast is not only felt to be highly unfair, but also creates 
uncertainty among the middle class.
Although the year of the financial crisis, 2009, saw the number of high-income house-
holds decrease, the average incomes of the remaining rich households continued to 
rise. As a result of job market measures, the lower income bracket has scarcely been 
affected by the financial and economic crisis. 
Evidence of an increasingly unequal distribution of income in the US since the late 
1970s has been virtually undisputed. In Europe, too, the widening income gap has 
become ever more apparent. In Germany, however, there was still no clear trend to-
wards rising inequality in the income distribution even as late as the mid-1990s.1
Since 2000, the disparity in incomes has without question widened in Germany 
as well.2 The discussion and empirical research on this issue has focused on the 
phenomenon of rising poverty.3 As of yet, however, there has been little empirical 
analysis addressing the question of income polarisation. Polarisation is understood to 
mean the increasing difference in incomes between the rich and the poor—in other 
1 For example, Hauser, R.: Die Entwicklung der Einkommens- und Vermögensverteilung in Deutschland—ein Über-
blick. [The development of income and wealth distribution in Germany - an overview.] In: „Informationen zur Raument-
wicklung“ [Information on Spatial Development], 3-4, 2003, pp. 111-124.
2 Frick, J. R., Goebel, J., Grabka, M. M., Krause, P., Schäfer, A., Tucci, I., Wagner, G. G.: Zur langfristigen Entwicklung von 
Einkommen und Armut in Deutschland. [On the long-term development of income and poverty in Germany] Wochen-
bericht des DIW 4/2005; Bach, S., Steiner, V.: Increasing inequality in market incomes: Real growth only for the rich. 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin 13/2007.
3 Frick, J. R., Grabka, M.M.: Weiterhin hohes Armutsrisko in Deutschland: Kinder und junge Erwachsene sind besonders 
betroffen. [Continuing high risk of poverty in Germany: children and young adults are especially at risk.] Wochenbe-
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words, between each pole of the income distribution 
and the centre.
Polarisation does not equal 
inequality
The analysis of income polarisation differs funda-
mentally from the analysis of income inequality or 
income poverty in that changes in the income dis-
tribution are analysed by focusing on how the two 
tails of the income distribution change compared to 
the centre.4 In contrast to poverty research, the inter-
est here is not only in changes the size and income 
levels of the lower bracket, but also those of the 
upper bracket. In measuring income polarisation, 
therefore, three groups are generally distinguished: 
lower, middle and upper.
However, a generally recognised practice used 
to demarcate the upper and lower income ranges 
does not exist. In the following, therefore, these 
income ranges will follow the definitions used in the 
German Federal Government’s Report on Poverty 
and Wealth.5 It describes the lower income range 
as the low-income group, defined as households 
with a needs-weighted equivalised disposable in-
come of greater than 30 percent below the median 
income. The upper income bracket begins with a 
household income 50 percent or more above the 
median income and covers the income bracket with 
assured prosperity. The following groups are based 
on these definitions:
Lower bracket (low income): a household  •	
income of less than 70 percent of the medi-
an; in 2005, this equalled around 860 euros 
per month.
Medium  bracket  (middle  income):  a  •	
household income of at least 70 percent, 
but not more than 150 percent of the me-
dian income; in 2005, this equalled around 
1,844 euros per month.
Upper  bracket  (high  income):  a  •	
household  income  of  more  than  150 
percent  of  the  median;  in  2005,  this 
was more than 1,844 euros per month. 
Various types of polarisation can be distinguished: 
on the one hand, a relative polarisation in which 
the medium income group shrinks in relation to 
4 For a more detailed description of the concept of income polarisation, 
see Esteban, J., Debraj, R.: On the Measurement of Polarisation. Econome-
trica 62, 1994, pp. 819-851.
5 Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (2001, 2005, 2008). The 
poverty risk threshold per the standard EU definition in the Report on Po-
verty and Wealth is set at 60 percent of the median income. The wealth 
threshold is taken as 200 percent of the median income.
the other two, but with no worsening in the average 
income position of any group as a whole. Absolute 
polarisation refers to an increase not only of the 
share of the lower income group in the income dis-
tribution, but additionally with a decreasing median 
income in this income group.
Severe polarisation threatens social 
cohesion
From a socio-economic viewpoint, polarisation has 
to be judged differently than a unilateral increase 
in poverty or a general increase in the inequality of 
the distribution. When there is an increase in the 
inequality of an income distribution that remains sta-
ble in its overall structure, that is, the relative size of 
the groups remains constant. All of the groups may 
be earning more than they were before, but the dis-
parities between them have increased. When there is 
polarisation in incomes, however, the structure shifts 
in such a way that both the top and bottom income 
groups grow, while the middle group shrinks. Put 
simply, some people in this middle group will rise 
to join the upper income group while others will fall 
into the lower group.
This shift is relevant, regardless of whether it is 
accompanied by an increase in the statistically meas-
Figure 1
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Viewed over the long term, it is above all the medium income 
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ured inequality or not. In people’s perceptions, this 
is seen as an increase in inequality: on the one hand, 
the number of wealthy people increases, while on 
the other, the number of those forced to subsist on a 
low income or below the poverty line also increases. 
Understandably, this trend is particularly worrisome 
for the middle-income group, who perceive descent 
into the lower income group as a severe threat to 
the status they have managed to achieve.6 Severe 
polarisation in incomes may threaten social cohe-
sion, since the stabilizing effect that a broadly-based 
middle class has will diminish when the life and con-
sumption opportunities available to the people—and 
with it their realms of experience—begin to develop 
more strongly in opposite directions.
Prior analyses have identified at least the begin-
nings of increasing polarisation in Germany, as 
demonstrated by a decreasing share of households 
in the middle-income group (the so-called “middle 
class”) and slightly increased in the upper and lower 
groups.7 The present analysis builds upon this result 
with current figures, and broadens its scope with 
the income positions of the various groups (Box 
1). The focus is also on another question: whether 
developments in the economy as a whole— such as 
the current financial and economic crisis—influence 
the trend toward polarisation.
The tails of income distribution gain 
in significance
Taking into consideration the distribution among the 
three groups used here, the constant growth in the 
share of households with low incomes in the last five 
years is particularly conspicuous (Figure 1). These 
households increased from 19 percent of the popula-
tion in 2004 to almost 22 percent in 2009. Parallel 
to this, an increase in the share of households with 
more than 150 percent of the median income is also 
evident. In fact, their numbers have risen by and 
large continuously since 2000. Only in 2009, with 
the advent of the financial and economic crisis, did 
the proportion of richer households decline slightly. 
The longer-term trend has thus seen the medium-
income group decline in size more than the other 
groups. As a result, the significance of the „middle 
6 Lengfeld, H., Hirschle, J.: Die Angst der Mittelschicht vor dem sozialen 
Abstieg. Eine Längsschnittanalyse 1984–2007. [The middle class‘s fear 
of social decline. A cross-sectional analysis 1984-2007.] Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie [Journal of Sociology], Vol. 38, Issue 5, 2009, pp. 379-398; 
Schupp, J.: Aspekte sozialer Ungleichheit in Deutschland. [Aspects of so-
cial inequality in Germany.] Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik [Journal of 
Economic Policy], Vol. 59, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 6-22.
7 Frick, J. R., Grabka, M. M.: Schrumpfende Mittelschicht—Anzeichen ei-
ner dauerhaften Polarisierung der verfügbaren Einkommen? [Shrinking 
middle class—signs of sustained polarisation in disposable incomes?] 
Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin 10/2008.
Box 1
Database
Our analysis of disposable household incomes is based 
on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study, 
conducted by DIW Berlin in partnership with TNS 
Infratest Social Research.1
Disposable household income is measured in a number 
of ways in the SOEP. First, at the end of the questionnaire 
is an explicit question (screener) about the respondent’s 
current monthly household income at the time of the 
survey—i.e., regular earnings after deducting taxes and 
social security contributions, and including any social 
security transfers received. Second, all individual (gross) 
earnings of current respondents in the household are 
added up for the past year. This, with the aid of esti-
mated tax and social security contributions and imputed 
values for missing data or  non-respondents, is used to 
calculate the annual net income for the previous year.2 
This analysis relies on the net monthly needs-weighted 
household income (screener) because this data is more 
up-to-date.3 Note, however, that the values for 2009 are 
based on a provisional weighting derived from observa-
tions of the SOEP sample survey.
All income data is in euros. The analyses are performed 
at the individual level and represent the entire German 
population in private households. To take into account 
the development of purchasing power, incomes have 
been adjusted across the board to 2005 prices.4 The 
price adjustment is in each case based on the year of 
the survey.
1  The SOEP is a representative tracking study of private househol-
ds that has been conducted annually in West Germany since 1984 
and since 1990 in the former East Germany, cf. Wagner, G. G., Göbel, 
J., Krause, P., Pischner, R., Sieber, I.: Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel 
(SOEP):  Multidisziplinäres  Haushaltspanel  und  Kohortenstudie  für 
Deutschland—Eine Einführung (für neue Datennutzer) mit einem 
Ausblick  (für  erfahrene  Anwender).  [The  Socio-Economic  Panel 
(SOEP): Multidisciplinary household panel and cohort study for Ger-
many - An introduction (for new data users) with outlook (for advan-
ced users).] In: AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, Vol. 
2, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 301-328.
2  Frick, J. R., Grabka, M. M.: Item Nonresponse on Income Questions 
in Panel Surveys: Incidence, Imputation and the Impact on Inequality 
and Mobility. Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, Issue 89, 2005, pp. 
49-61.
3  The income situations of households of various sizes and compo-
sitions are compared by translating them into „equivalised“ incomes, 
i.e. per-capita incomes weighted to needs. This involves converting 
household incomes using a scale proposed by the OECD. As a result, 
the head of household is given a weighting of 1, further adults a 
weighting of 0.5 and children 0.3. Everyone under the age of 14 is 
considered a child.
4  Taken from the official price indices of the Federal Office of Stati-
stics.202
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increasing, but that they are on average becoming 
poorer as well.
The differences between the upper income groups 
show a similar trend toward polarisation. In ab-
solute terms, the gap between the upper income 
group and the middle income group rose from 1,165 
euros in 1999 to 1,360 euros in 2009. The upper 
income group’s relative earnings increased from 
91 to more than 104 percent of the median income. 
This confirms the trend in Germany that the rich are 
not only growing in number but are, on the whole, 
getting richer as well. Although the financial crisis 
of 2009 caused the share of high-income households 
to decrease, the households in this group in 2009 
had a far higher average income than in the years 
before. In absolute terms, the gap between the upper 
and middle income group increased considerably 
between 2008 to 2009 as well.
Income polarisation increasing 
gradually
Not least because of the aforementioned ambiguous   
developments in the shares of income groups and the 
class“ has diminished. At first glance, however, the 
trend toward a shrinking middle class appears to 
have been halted with the financial and economic 
crisis of 2009. The share of persons in households 
with median incomes has risen again for the first 
time since 2000, if only by 0.6 percentage points, 
from 60.9 percent in 2008 to 61.5 in 2009.
However, whether the current trend indicates the 
end of income polarisation can only be assessed 
by including the evolution of income relationships 
between the groups. Calculations of average house-
hold income in the three income groups show that 
both absolute and relative income differences have 
increased dramatically since 1993 (Table). The earn-
ings gap between those earning low incomes and 
those earning high incomes has continued to widen 
in Germany.
Since 2000, this development has gained pace mark-
edly, with the absolute gap between the lower and 
the medium income group growing from around 590 
euros in 1999 to some 630 euros in 2009. In relation 
to median incomes, the relative earnings deficit has 
increased from 46 to more than 48 percent. This 
clearly means that not only are the ranks of the poor 
Box 2
The methodology
In 1994, Esteban and Ray not only formulated the identity-
alienation framework, but also proposed how polarisation 
might be measured empirically.1 The index they set out 
weights relationships of population groups to each other 
by the absolute distance between the median incomes 
in each group. A simple Euclidean distance is used to 
measure the gap. The index is thus defined as
where n represents the number of groups, πi the relative 
size of group i, and yi the median income in group i. The 
parameter α determines the degree of sensitivity of the 
population to polarisation, i.e., how much the degree of 
polarisation varies from standard inequality measures. Or, 
to put it another way, it measures how strongly an indi-
vidual in group i feels alienated from group j.2 If α = 0, this 
polarisation measure is identical with the Gini coefficient 
used in measuring inequality. Since the bounds are set 
randomly, Esteban, Gradín and Ray propose a generalized 
version of this index, defined as follows:3
1 Esteban, J., Debraj, R.: On the Measurement of Polarisation. Econome-
trica 62, 1994, pp. 819-851.
2 Esteban and Ray further show that α must be less than 1.6 if the axi-
oms they propose to measure polarisation with are to remain valid.
3 Esteban, J., s Gradín, C., Debraj, R.: An Extension of a Measure of Po-
P(f, α, β) = ER(α, ρ*) – β [G(f) – G(ρ*)]
ER is the Esteban and Ray polarisation index described 
above, from which an error term has been subtracted. 
G is the Gini coefficient. The difference between the 
Gini coefficient of the original and the grouped incomes 
can be weighted with β. The generalization set forward 
by Esteban, Gradín and Ray, however, corrects not only 
the otherwise disregarded inequality within the defined 
groups, but also proposes an algorithm to automatically 
set the group boundaries. Researchers today no longer 
define exact income bands, but only the number of groups 
to be formed. The group bounds are then selected in such 
a way that the spread of incomes within the groups is 
minimized, or expressed differently, in such a way that 
the corrective term deducted later is minimised. In the 
empirical analysis, α = 1.3 and β = 0.5, and thus correspond 
to the centre of each possible range.
To estimate the statistical error probability in determin-
ing the polarisation measure, confidence intervals were 
set by a bootstrap method. We worked in each case with 
500 replications.
larisation, with an Application to the Income Distribution of Five OECD 
Countries. The Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2007, 
pp. 1-19.
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differences in incomes between the groups, attempts 
have been made to collate the dimensions of polari-
sation into an index—a polarisation index. One of 
the best-known and most developed indices is the 
polarisation index formulated by Esteban, Gradín 
and Ray (Box 2). Figure 2 shows the development of 
this index for Germany. The grey field (confidence 
bands) shows the area where the statistical error 
probability produced by the sampling methods used 
to analyse the data is under five percent.
In Germany, the polarisation of income has come in 
a series of waves. An initial high point in inequal-
ity came in the mid-1990s, and was followed by a 
phase of slightly narrowing polarisation until 2000. 
After that, polarisation escalated before reaching 
its current apex in 2006. Since then, no statistically 
significant change has been recorded. For Germany 
as a whole, the polarisation index also shows no 
marked reaction to the crisis of 2009.
Measuring the development of the polarisation in-
dex against the dynamics of the national economy, 
there appears to be a connection in fluctuations in 
income polarisation and economic growth (Fig. 2). 
Those years with weaker or declining employment 
trends—1993, 1994 and 2003 to 2005—were fol-
lowed in 1995 and 2006 by peaks in income polari-
sation. The phase of strong economic and employ-
ment growth, which lasted from 1998 to 2000, may 
not have decreased the income polarisation much, 
but it certainly stabilized polarisation at a higher 
overall level. The indications point to a similar re-
action to the strong years of economic growth in 
2007 and 2008.
In view of the close link between short-term changes 
in income polarisation and the trend of economic 
activity, it also comes as no surprise that the crisis of 
2009 has not led to a major increase in polarisation, 
given that the crisis has so far had little impact on 
the labour market. Political efforts to dampen the ef-
fects of the global financial crisis have at least been 
successful in warding off a short-term worsening of 
income polarisation in Germany.
Income differences in former East 
Germany are still lower
Compared to the country as a whole, East Germany 
has seen a stronger increase in low-income earners 
in the last decade, from around 24 in 2000 to al-
most 31 percent in 2009. While the lower proportion 
of high-income earners in the East in the first few 
years after reunification is not surprising, the sharp 
increase in the share of higher incomes in the East 
up to just after the turn of the millennium certainly 
is. Since then, the share of high-income earners has 
remained relatively stable at nine to ten percent. In 
Table
Equivalised monthly incomes in Germany
Average values of income groups Deviations to middle-income group
Low incomes Medium incomes High incomes Low incomes  High incomes Low incomes  High incomes
in euros in euros in %
1993 643 1,222 2,372 -579 1,149 -47.4 94
1994 646 1,222 2,371 -576 1,149 -47.1 94
1995 643 1,232 2,500 -589 1,269 -47.8 103
1996 664 1,251 2,478 -588 1,227 -47.0 98
1997 660 1,243 2,413 -583 1,170 -46.9 94.1
1998 667 1,237 2,367 -570 1,130 -46.1 91.3
1999 685 1,270 2,436 -586 1,165 -46.1 91.7
2000 680 1,287 2,569 -607 1,282 -47.2 99.7
2001 690 1,300 2,561 -610 1,262 -46.9 97.1
2002 664 1,279 2,669 -616 1,389 -48.1 108.6
2003 669 1,300 2,690 -631 1,390 -48.5 106.9
2004 657 1,264 2,583 -607 1,319 -48.0 104.4
2005 659 1,269 2,567 -610 1,298 -48.1 102.2
2006 650 1,255 2,626 -605 1,370 -48.2 109.2
2007 651 1,251 2,569 -601 1,318 -48.0 105.3
2008 645 1,252 2,538 -607 1,287 -48.5 102.8
2009 677 1,311 2,672 -634 1,360 -48.3 103.7
Sources: SOEP; calculations by DIW Berlin.  DIW Berlin 2010
Income disparities have grown sharply since the turn of the millennium, both in absolute and in relative terms.204
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sum, there has been a more pronounced decline in 
median incomes in the former East Germany than 
in the West.
For the low-income bracket in East Germany, the 
development of income differences follows the 
overall German development, i.e., an increase in the 
absolute and relative gap between the low income 
bracket and the medium income bracket. In the East, 
however the gap between the upper income bracket 
and the medium income bracket is not increasing, 
but has declined from 106 percent in 1999 to 97 
percent in 2009.
The stabilization of high incomes, the strong in-
crease in low-incomes and the increase in the rela-
tive distance between the lower income group and 
the medium income group is also demonstrated in 
the development of the polarisation index calculated 
for the former East Germany (Figure 3). From 1997 
to 2009, polarisation increased by 16 percent in the 
East compared to just 11 percent in the West.
Conclusion
The analysis presented here shows that the period of 
relative polarisation from 1993 to 1999, in which all 
income groups saw a slight increase in real incomes, 
albeit of differing dimensions, was followed from 
2000 to 2009 by a period of absolute polarisation, 
in which the distances between the groups not only 
widened, but the upper group’s real income grew, 
while the lower group not only suffered relative 
losses, but absolute ones as well. An increase in 
income inequality is certainly a far more serious 
matter for the losers, who not only see the disparity 
between their incomes and the higher incomes, but 
also have less money at their disposal with each 
passing month.
The data analysis presented here proves that there has 
been a clear rise in the lower-income earning groups, 
and that middle-income group, which has grown 
enormously over the period since the Second World 
War, has lost out through the income redistribution 
of the last decade.8 While some have risen from this 
group into the upper income bracket, many more 
have descended into lower income brackets.9
If this descent is perceived as imminent, or even as 
a potential threat, it can, as C. W. Mills termed it, 
nurture „status panic“ among the middle classes.10 
Since the middle classes’ status is based on income 
and not property, they are particularly sensitive to 
developments that threaten this status. That may 
go hand-in-hand with a tendency to blame another 
population group for this loss of status, and may 
8 Herbert Quandt Foundation: Zwischen Erosion und Erneuerung. Die 
gesellschaftliche Mitte in Deutschland. Ein Lagebericht. [Between Erosi-
on and Renewal. The Middle Classes in Germany. A status report.] Bad 
Homburg, 2007.
9 Frick, J. R., Grabka, M. M.: Schrumpfende Mittelschicht [The shrinking 
middle class], ibid.
10 Mills, C. W.: Menschen im Büro: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Ange-
stellten. [White Collar: The American Middle Classes.] Oxford University 
Press, USA, 1951.
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Since 1997, polarisation of income in former East Germany has increased at a greater 
rate than in West Germany.
Figure 2











1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Polarisation index with 
confidence band at the 
95% level
Change in labour force numbers 
in percent (right-hand scale)
Sources: SOEP; Federal Office of Statistics; calculations by DIW Berlin.   DIW Berlin 2010
The polarisation index describes the extent to which a society is organised around 
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contribute to the spread of discriminatory attitudes 
(such as xenophobia and racism).11 Income polarisa-
tion cannot therefore be dismissed as an irrelevant 
shift in the income distribution. Rather, it indicates 
the crucial need to safeguard the “centre ground” 
in order to maintain the stability of democratic 
decision-making processes.
Moreover, sustained income polarisation is also 
linked with potentially negative consequences in 
terms of the social environment. This is especially 
the case in the major cities.12 A changed distribution 
of income and a growing number of households 
with very low incomes would make a greater con-
centration of low-income households noticeable in 
those areas of the city where rents are low. These 
are dilapidated areas in the older parts of the inner 
11 Vgl. Heitmeyer, W. (Ed.): Deutsche Zustände. [German Conditions.] 
No. 8, Frankfurt/Main 2009.
12 Ähnelt, R., Göbel, J., Gornig, M., Häußermann, H.: Soziale Ungleich-
heit und sozialräumliche Strukturen in deutschen Städten. [Social ine-
quality and socio-spatial structures in German cities.] In: „Informationen 
zur Raumentwicklung“ [Information on Spatial Development], 6, 2009, 
pp. 405–413.
city, and other districts with low living quality and 
low social prestige. The transformation of income 
polarisation can be expected to create greater spatial 
polarisation in the cities the more that the hous-
ing supply is controlled by market forces—if, for 
instance, public housing plays an ever-diminishing 
role, as is indeed the case in more and more German 
cities. In the course of this development, a stronger 
spatial concentration of households beset by social 
problems leads to the creation of districts that bear 
the stigma of a slum. A life context emerges there 
that is marked by resignation and pessimism, one 
that is especially disadvantageous for children and 
young people—especially considering that social 
segregation in schools is even stronger than in the 
neighborhood setting.
(First published as “Polarisierung der Einkommen: Die 
Mittelschicht verliert”, in: Wochenbericht des DIW 
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